The relationship between the principle of identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence

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dc.contributor.author Ruiz Gómez, Leonardo
dc.date.accessioned 2019-06-18T14:57:39Z
dc.date.available 2019-06-18T14:57:39Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.identifier.issn 0039-3185 es_ES, en_US
dc.identifier.other Campus Ciudad de México es_ES, en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://scripta.up.edu.mx/xmlui/handle/123456789/4883
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.25162/SL-2017-0005
dc.description.abstract The aim of this paper is to render a detailed analysis of the correspondence with Clarke in order to shed some light in the relationship between the Principle of Identity oflndiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Most of the secondary literature takes for granted that Leibniz derives the Principle of Identity of Indiscernible from the Principle of Sufficient Reason in at least some parts of the correspondence. This would render the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles a merely contingent truth and not a necessary principle. I will argue that this interpretation is misleading, and that Leibniz never abandoned the idea that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessary truth. Although he is continuously using the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his argumentation, he keeps in parallel a strong argumentation that entails the necessity of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to point out first some contextual facts that may determine a correct understanding of the correspondence. It will be also necessary to frame the discussion about the principles into the broader debate on the possibility of Newtonian space. Finally, it will be shown that the mentioned hypothesis is supported by textual evidence throughout the entire correspondence. © 2017 Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH. All right resrrved. es_ES, en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility Investigadores es_ES, en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Filosofía es_ES, en_US
dc.language Inglés es_ES, en_US
dc.publisher Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH es_ES, en_US
dc.relation Versión del editor es_ES, en_US
dc.relation.ispartof REPOSITORIO SCRIPTA es_ES, en_US
dc.relation.ispartof OPENAIRE es_ES, en_US
dc.rights Acceso Abierto es_ES, en_US
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 es_ES, en_US
dc.subject Necessary truth es_ES, en_US
dc.subject Newtonian space es_ES, en_US
dc.subject Principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII) es_ES, en_US
dc.subject Principle of sufficient reason (PSR) es_ES, en_US
dc.subject.classification HUMANIDADES Y CIENCIAS DE LA CONDUCTA es_ES, en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
dc.subject.lcsh Clarke, Samuel, 1675-1729
dc.title The relationship between the principle of identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence es_ES, en_US
dc.type Artículo es_ES, en_US


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