Hedoné, teleíosis and enérgeia in Aristotle
Journal
Antiquorum Philosophia
ISSN
1974-4501
Date Issued
2019
Author(s)
Type
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article
Abstract
Hedoné, teleíosis and enérgeia in Aristotle · The aim of this paper is to discuss the Aristotelian defnition of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics x 4. In those passages, Aristotle offers several arguments to prove that pleasure is not a movement (kínesis), or a coming into being. The nature of pleasure would imply a diferent kind of assimilation, something closer to an enérgeia. Even though, it is not clear in those texts, if pleasure is strictly speaking an activity or something that completes it. We fnd passages pointing out in both directions. In any case, a pleasure would complete an activity not as the inherent state does, but as an end which supervenes, just «as the bloom of youth does on those in the fower of their age». I will try to clarify the sense of this metaphor in the framework of Aristotle’s ontology and his ethical account in order to explain the Aristotelian defnition of pleasure.