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dc.contributor.authorRosellon, Juan
dc.coverage.spatialMéxico
dc.creatorJUAN DE DIOS ENRIQUE ROSELLON DIAZ;14945
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-09T14:32:36Z
dc.date.available2018-10-09T14:32:36Z
dc.date.issued2018-09
dc.identifier.citationReza Hesamzadeh, M., Rosellon Díaz, J. de D. E., Gabriel, S.A. y Vogelsang, I. (2018). A simple regulatory incentive mechanism applied to electricity transmission pricing and investment. Energy Economics, 75, 423-439. DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.08.033es_ES, en_US
dc.identifier.issn0140-9883es_ES, en_US
dc.identifier.otherCampus Ciudad de Méxicoes_ES, en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12552/4692
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.08.033
dc.description.abstractThe informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator's objective function into the firm's profit-maximizing objective. These mechanisms come in two forms, one based on subsidies/taxes, the other based on constraints/price caps. In spite of a number of improvements and a good empirical track record simple approaches so far remain imperfect. The current paper comes up with a new proposal, called H-R-G-V, which blends the two traditions and is shown in simulations to apply well to electricity transmission pricing and investment. In particular, it induces immediately optimal pricing/investment but is not based on subsidies. In the transmission application, the H-R-G-V approach is based on a bilevel optimization with the transmission company (Transco) at the top and the independent system operator (ISO) at the bottom level. We show that H-R-G-V, while not perfect, marks an improvement over the other simple mechanisms and a convergence of the two traditions. We suggest ways to deal with remaining practical issues of demand and cost functions changing over time. © 2018 Elsevier B.V.es_ES, en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityInvestigadoreses_ES, en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsCiencias Económicas y Empresarialeses_ES, en_US
dc.languageenges_ES, en_US
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.es_ES, en_US
dc.relationVersión aceptadaes_ES, en_US
dc.relation.ispartofREPOSITORIO SCRIPTAes_ES, en_US
dc.relation.ispartofOPENAIREes_ES, en_US
dc.rightsAcceso Embargadoes_ES, en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0es_ES, en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0140-9883/
dc.sourceEnergy Economics
dc.subjectCost functionses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectCostses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectElectric utilitieses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectInvestmentses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectBi-level optimizationes_ES, en_US
dc.subjectBilevel programses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectDemand and cost functionses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectElectricity transmissiones_ES, en_US
dc.subjectIncentive regulationses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectIndependent system operatorses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectTransmission company (TRANSCO)es_ES, en_US
dc.subjectTransmission investmentses_ES, en_US
dc.subjectEconomicses_ES, en_US
dc.subject.classificationCIENCIAS SOCIALESes_ES, en_US
dc.titleA simple regulatory incentive mechanism applied to electricity transmission pricing and investmentes_ES, en_US
dc.typeArtículoes_ES, en_US


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