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    Medicina nel pensiero messicano preispanico
    (2018)
    Many people are still convinced that the indigenous medicine was in a stage of admixture with witchcraft and magic, more or less as it is believed for medicine to be practiced among so called «primitive» civilizations. This conviction is contradicted by what the first Spanish conquerors explicitly declared regarding medicine they encountered in the new land of conquest, and it is even more in contradiction with the very clear distinctions that «scientific» doctors of Mexico prior to the arrival of Cortés expressed in their texts, in which they separated clearly their way of conceiving and practicing medicine from the practices of the sorcerers, curators and charlatans. ©2018 Rivista di Filosofía Neo-scolastica.
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    Teoria della conoscenza e neuroscienze
    (2015)
    Theory of knowledge can be understood differently according to two different meanings of knowledge. In a first sense knowledge is understood as the process of cognition, in the second sense it means the result of such cognition (what we know). These two meanings are mirrored in certain different terms used in different languages. A theory of knowledge understood in the second sense (corresponding to "epistemology" in English) has no significant links with the neurosciences (but rather with philosophical disciplines like logic, methodology, semiotics, ontology), whereas it has such links if it is understood in the first sense (corresponding to the English""philosophy of mind"). Indeed already ancient philosophers have recognized the brain as the physical support of the most advanced cognitive processes. Nevertheless it would be wrong to consider the neurosciences as a replacement of philosophy of mind, because the cognitive processes must first be defined philosophically, in order their (bidirectional) correlations with nervous phenomena to be investigated. ©Epistemologia
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