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Deliberation, action and normativity
(Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía, 2009)
Ortiz-Millán, Gustavo
En este artículo hago comentarios a varios aspectos del artículo de Martin Seel, “The Ability to Deliberate”, principalmente en sus afirmaciones de que la deliberación es una forma de acción, en su no muy clara distinción entre deliberación y pensamiento, y en la relación entre normatividad y deliberación. Hay también algunos comentarios sobre el razonamiento práctico y el teórico, así como en su caracterización de lo que son las razones.
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Self-Consciousness and the Priority Question: A Critique of the “Sensibility First” Reading of Kant
(Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía, 2022)
Ellis, Addison
This essay presents a critique of what Robert Hanna has re-cently called the “sensibility first” reading of Kant. I first spell out, in agreement with Hanna, why the contemporary debate among Kant scholars over conceptualism and non-conceptu-alism must be understood only from within the perspective of what I dub the “priority question”—that is, the question wheth-er one or the other of our “two stems” of cognition may ground the objectivity and normativity of the other. I then spell out why the priority question may be asked only from within the per-spective of self-consciousness. Specifically, the central issue to be dealt with is how what Kant calls the original combination of understanding and sensibility is a synthesis internal to an act of self-consciousness. Only then can we ask what that original synthesis might tell us about the possibility of prioritizing one capacity over another in a story of cognition generally. Once we see the central issue more clearly, then I will look at the “sen-sibility first” view in its most general form and propose that it should be criticized for its failure to account for Kant’s notion of an objective unity of self-consciousness
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The Deductions of Freedom / Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems
(Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía, 2015)
Rudy Hiller, Fernando
The first objective of this paper is to present an interpretation of Groundwork III which aims to establish two main points: first, that Kant offers there a theoretically-grounded deduction (in Kantian sense) of freedom/morality-as-autonomy; second, that Kant also offers a separate deduction of the categorical imperative. Thus, contrary to what several commentators have claimed, Groundwork III contains a theoretically-grounded double deduction. The second objective of the paper is to examine and criticize in detail one crucial step in these deductions, namely, Kant’s inference from the speculative spontaneity of reason to the noumenal existence of the subject as a free will. I show that Kant himself came to reject this inference in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and argue that this explains Kant’s rejection, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of the deduction of the moral law he previously offered. Thus, contrary to the “reconciliationist” reading, there is indeed a great reversal in the latter work.
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