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    Item type:Publication,
    An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions
    (Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía, 2023)
    Vilaró, Ignacio
    According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistem-ic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radi-cal position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skep-tical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view.
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    Item type:Publication,
    ¿Es moralmente reprobable sostener o adoptar creencias religiosas?
    (Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía, 2004)
    Gensollen Mendoza, Mario
    ;
    MARIO GENSOLLEN MENDOZA;48489
    ¿Hay algo moralmente reprochable en sostener o adoptar creencias religiosas? De la mano de Agustín, Aristóteles, William James, Ortega y Gasset, Wittgenstein y Austin, el autor trata de mostrar en este artículo las dificultades de articular coherentemente la razón por la cual podemos adoptar o sostener creencias religiosas sin reproches morales. Más aún, él muestra las insuficiencias de la defensa pragmática de Agustín en De utilitate credendi, optando por una reconsideración de los textos wittgensteineanos para aclarar el problema.
      36  130