Una defensa de los deberes para con uno mismo en Kant y algunas observaciones respecto de su replanteamiento en Fichte

De Haro Romo, Vicente

Una defensa de los deberes para con uno mismo en Kant y algunas observaciones respecto de su replanteamiento en Fichte

Journal

Signos Filosóficos

ISSN

1665-1324

Date Issued

2015

Author(s)

Type

Resource Types::text::journal::journal article

URL

https://scripta.up.edu.mx/handle/20.500.12552/4746

Abstract

One of the most frequently criticized elements of Kant´s Metaphysics of Morals is the possibility of ethical duties to oneself. In this article I consider the most common arguments against these duties (from the standpoint of Utilitarianism) and I show how they can be refuted using Kant´s argumentation himself. Afterwards, I point out how Fichte, in his Doctrine of Morals, accepts the duties to oneself, but relocates them within the system of duties. Finally, I suggest that the fichtean reinterpretation emerges from a confusion over the role of the first-person moral agent in the Kantian ideal of the Kingdom of ends.