Memory in the Philosophy of Religion: Temptations of the Cartesian Demon in Epistemology and Theodicy
Journal
Forum Philosophicum
ISSN
1426-1898
2353-7043
Publisher
Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
Date Issued
2024
Type
text::journal::journal article
Abstract
This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes’ assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. ©The author © Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie © Forum Philosophicum.
License
Acceso Abierto
How to cite
Briedis, Mindaugas. 2024. "Memory in the Philosophy of Religion: Temptations of the Cartesian Demon in Epistemology and Theodicy." Forum Philosophicum 29 (1): 139–52. doi:10.35765/forphil.2024.2901.07