Editorial Preface: Thought Experiments in Mathematics
Journal
Global Philosophy
ISSN
2948-152X
2948-1538
Publisher
Springer
Date Issued
2023
Author(s)
Buzzoni, Marco
Type
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article
Abstract
In light of the problem just pointed out in the philosophy of TEs in mathematics, James Robert Brown’s essay “Rigour and Thought Experiments: Burgess and Norton” makes an important contribution, both in its pars destruens and in its pars construens, toward grasping the distinctive feature of thought experiments in mathemtics. As is well known, Brown argues for a largely Platonic view, according to which we have a certain (albeit fallible) cognitive capacity that allows us to grasp truth both in the abstract realm of mathematics and - at least with respect to certain aspects of it - in that of empirical reality. From here, he discusses John Burgess’ views on the nature of mathematical rigour and John Norton’s views on the nature of thought experiments. In both cases, in order to evaluate them, it is necessary to reconstruct the starting point, a mathematical proof or a thought experiment respectively. © 2024 Springer Nature
How to cite
Buzzoni, M., & Agazzi, E. (2023). Editorial Preface: Thought Experiments in Mathematics. In Global Philosophy (Vol. 33, Issue 1). Springer Science and Business Media LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09667-1