Tracing Classical Roots of Assertiveness: The Aristotelian Virtue
Journal
Assertiveness in the Context of Human Rights, Ethics, and Classical Virtues
Publisher
Springer Nature Switzerland
Date Issued
2024
Author(s)
Siqueiros Fernández, José Enrique
Type
text::book::book part
Abstract
This chapter traces the conceptual origins of assertiveness back to the Aristotelian notion of virtue: a purposive disposition, mid-point between two vices, determined by the right reason. First, it defines common and technical uses of assertiveness. Second, it justifies using Aristotle’s notion of virtue to better understand its conceptual complexity and practical training. Third, it analyses Aristotelian origins in each of the contemporary senses addressed by Peneva and Mavrodiev’s study A Historical Approach to Assertiveness: (1) as a method to diagnose and control mental illnesses, (2) as a mean of self-advocacy, (3) as a way of achieving human flourishing and, finally, (4) assertiveness as a social and professional skill. The author claims that these historical perspectives are rooted in the same moral classical principle: a virtuous disposition as understood in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Politics (P) and Rhetoric (Rh). ©The author ©Springer.
License
Acceso Restringido
How to cite
Siqueiros-Fernández, E. (2024). Tracing Classical Roots of Assertiveness: The Aristotelian Virtue. In: Castaños-Cervantes, S., Atristain-Suárez, C. (eds) Assertiveness in the Context of Human Rights, Ethics, and Classical Virtues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60962-6_4