Through the Looking Glass
Journal
Comparative Constitutional Reform in Latin America
Publisher
Routledge
Date Issued
2026
Author(s)
Garza-Martins, José Mario de la
Type
text::book::book part
Abstract
This chapter examines Mexico’s constitutional transformations through Richard Albert’s theory of constitutional dismemberments, distinguishing between amendments that preserve constitutional continuity and dismemberments that reconfigure constitutional identity. It traces Mexico’s trajectory from hyper-presidentialism to democratic liberalization, highlighting the 1994–95 judicial and electoral reforms and the 2011 human rights amendment as progressive dismemberments that entrenched judicial independence, electoral integrity, and the incorporation of international human rights law. By contrast, the 2024 judicial reform exemplifies a regressive dismemberment, dismantling core safeguards of judicial independence and constitutional review under the guise of democratization. Our analysis underscores the risks of abusive constitutionalism and the inadequacy of Mexico’s amendment procedure, which lacks substantive limits or judicial enforcement against regressive change. The chapter argues for the creation of constitutional safeguards—such as escalated amendment thresholds—to preserve the rule of law and prevent constitutional obliteration. © 2027 selection and editorial matter, Richard Albert; individual chapters, the contributors. © Rutledge.
Subjects
License
Acceso Restringido
How to cite
Olaiz-González, J., & de la Garza-Martins, J. M. (2026). Through the Looking Glass. In Comparative Constitutional Reform in Latin America (pp. 168–190). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003488071-9