El origen psicológico de los conceptos empíricos en la Crítica de la razón pura
Journal
Open Insight
ISSN
2007-2406
Date Issued
2019-06-12
Author(s)
Type
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article
Abstract
How do empirical concepts are, according to Kant, originated in the understanding? In this paper I want to show that the construction of empirical concepts is a task that corresponds to the schematism of the faculty of judgement, and that this construction should not to be identified, as it is usually done, with the process of comparison, reflection and abstraction explained by this author in the Logic Jäsche. It is rather by means of a psychological process that certain representational content of sensible nature is «intellectualized» -through what I call empirical schematism- to originate the empirical concept. According to my reading, schematism, as a capacity, not only makes possible the application of a category to an intuition, but it is responsible also of the construction and of a further application of empirical concepts to intuitions. © 2019 Centro de Investigacion Social Avanzada. All rights reserved.