Agazzi, Evandro
Main Affiliation
Preferred name
Agazzi, Evandro
Official Name
Agazzi Carminati, Evandro
ORCID
0000-0002-5131-7281
Researcher ID
CAQ-1712-2022
Scopus Author ID
56013702100
23 results
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Item type:Publication, Science and Experience of the Holy(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2025)The experience of the holy can be seen as part of the effort of human beings to construct a meaningful world. This perspective reveals that science and religion have both presented themselves in human history as strong values, characterized by different “types” of knowledge (with different degrees of certainty to which they aspire) and different goals. That they have often been able to integrate smoothly and at other times appear distant from each other is part of the historicity of human affairs. Today it is necessary for religious discourse to be able to express itself in a culture strongly permeated by the scientific mentality. As the paper tries to show, this capacity essentially depends on being able to clarify how scientific knowledge can be reconciled with the concept of a radical hope in a life beyond death, understood as an essential integration of meaning in human life. ©The author ©Springer. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Mental health-related, existential, and biological factors are associated with the desire to hasten death in Mexican cancer patients undergoing palliative care: A single-center study(Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2025) - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Un enfoque sistémico de la bioética del medioambiente y la complejidad(2024); <jats:p>La teoría general de sistemas ofrece un marco conceptual y metodológico para integrar consideraciones bioéticas en la toma de decisiones ambientales y ecológicas, enmarcando clara y eficazmente muchos problemas y situaciones que suelen presentarse utilizando el lenguaje ordinario. Un sistema es una entidad estructurada internamente que se caracteriza por algunas propiedades y funciones específicas. Esta unidad se relaciona con varias de sus partes que también son sistemas y son, por tanto, sus subsistemas. A su vez, cada sistema es parte (es decir, subsistema) de sistemas de orden superior. Todos estos sistemas y subsistemas están relacionados entre sí de tal manera que cada uno se caracteriza por sus propiedades específicas, que, además, resultan de las correlaciones que los unen a sus subsistemas y sistemas de orden superior. Dentro de esta arquitectura general se inscriben fácilmente conceptos como entorno y complejidad, así como emergencia, con todos los problemas relativos a los límites de las posibilidades de predicción mostrando que los enfoques deterministas tradicionales en la ciencia son insuficientes para manejar tal complejidad. El artículo aborda los desafíos que plantea la impredecibilidad en los sistemas complejos, criticando las visiones fatalistas que aceptan de manera optimista o pesimista la naturaleza incontrolable de los desarrollos tecnológicos y ecológicos. Es precisamente la impredecibilidad de un sistema complejo como el entorno lo que requiere una dimensión bioética para guiar los valores que subyacen a nuestra toma de decisiones respecto a la vida misma.</jats:p>29 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The truth of theories and scientific realism(Springer International Publishing, 2017)The thesis maintained in this paper is that scientific anti-realism was the consequence of having lost the confidence in the capability of science to attain truth, something that historically occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the requirement of truth was removed from science and replaced by the requirement of objectivity. This has a ‘weak’ sense, according to which scientific knowledge is ‘independent of the single subjects’ (intersubjectivity) In addition, however, every science is considered to investigate not reality in general, but only its specific objects (‘strong’ ontological sense of objectivity). These specific objects are ‘clipped out’ of the reality of common sense ‘things’ by considering them from a specific point of view focusing only on certain attributes of reality. In order to determine these clips, the scientific community elaborates certain standardized operational procedures for establishing whether certain statements regarding things are immediately true or false. In such a way these operational procedures are ‘criteria of reference’ and ‘criteria of truth’ for a given science, and moreover turn out to be the same used for securing objectivity in the weak sense. This amounts to recovering the characteristic of truth for scientific knowledge, and giving it a realist interpretation both ontologically and epistemologically, at least for its empirically testable statements. The contemporary struggle about realism, however, regards the unobservable entities introduced in scientific theories, and the strategy proposed in the present paper is that of suitably ‘extending’ to theories the notion of truth, which is immediately and directly defined for single declarative statements. From the referential nature of truth follows that if we have reasons for admitting the truth of a theory, we must also admit, for the same reasons, the existence of its referents, even when they are unobservable entities. ©Springer International Publishing.Scopus© Citations 2 3 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Multiple Aspects of the Philosophy of Science(2021)Philosophy of Science, understood as a special philosophical discipline, was born only at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the effort for overcoming the “foundational crisis” that had affected especially mathematics and physics. Therefore, it was conceived as an investigation about the features and reliability of scientific knowledge and for a few decades was deeply marked by the philosophical approach of logical empiricism. This cognitive point of view persisted also when, after Kuhn’s work, the attention focused on the scientific activity in order to understand scientific change and a sociological model replaced the view that empirical adequacy and logical consistency are the factors that determine the change of scientific theories. Ethical, social and political considerations regarding science ware considered inappropriate and potentially dangerous since they violate the alleged “neutrality of science” with respect to values. Nevertheless, the strict intertwining of science and technology in contemporary “technoscience” has produced a wide debate regarding the practical aspect of technoscientific activity that has the intrinsic features of a philosophical debate. Therefore, it is natural and advisable that the entire wealth of the philosophical disciplines (and not just logic, ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language) be called to contribute to the specific complex discourse of the Philosophy of Science.Scopus© Citations 1 9 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Factors associated with the quality of the patient-doctor relationship: a cross-sectional study of ambulatory Mexican patients with rheumatic diseases(2021)Scopus© Citations 4 23 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Methodological Turn in Philosophy(2015)<jats:p>Controversies have always characterized philosophy as expression of its typical critical attitude that depends on the complexity of the fundamental philosophical issues. Traditionally these discrepancies regarded the answers given to certain questions and, therefore, the content of the opposite doctrines, as all legitimately belonging to philosophy. With modernity the determination of the correct method of thinking becomes the necessary precondition for philosophizing and represents the core of the philosophical activity itself. As a consequence people adopting a certain method of thinking often qualify as non-philosophical the discourse of those who do not belong to their methodological school, independently of the content of the doctrine they defend. This dominance of the methodological concern, on the contrary, has produced the discovery and deepening of several “thinking methods,” whose plurality must be considered a wealth and not a reason for skepticism, since it can offer to philosophy the tools for better coping with the increasing complexity of its fundamental issues.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 1 4 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Ethical Criteria for the Admission and Management of Patients in the ICU Under Conditions of Limited Medical Resources: A Shared International Proposal in View of the COVID-19 Pandemic(2020)Scopus© Citations 21 21 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Methodological Turn in Philosophy(2015)<jats:p>Controversies have always characterized philosophy as expression of its typical critical attitude that depends on the complexity of the fundamental philosophical issues. Traditionally these discrepancies regarded the answers given to certain questions and, therefore, the content of the opposite doctrines, as all legitimately belonging to philosophy. With modernity the determination of the correct method of thinking becomes the necessary precondition for philosophizing and represents the core of the philosophical activity itself. As a consequence people adopting a certain method of thinking often qualify as non-philosophical the discourse of those who do not belong to their methodological school, independently of the content of the doctrine they defend. This dominance of the methodological concern, on the contrary, has produced the discovery and deepening of several “thinking methods,” whose plurality must be considered a wealth and not a reason for skepticism, since it can offer to philosophy the tools for better coping with the increasing complexity of its fundamental issues.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 1 14 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The problems of scientific realism today(2022)The article describes scientific realism and the debate around this position. It shows that initially (in the scholastic tradition) the debate between realists and antirealists was purely ontological, since it was accepted that when we know, we know the real − knowledge cannot be anything other than knowledge of the real. The question about the reality of the object of our knowledge, about whether the world beyond our representations is equal to the world we represent to ourselves, distinguishes modern philosophy from classical philosophy and arises from the claim that we know our representations and not the real. A twofold problem is formed: first, to demonstrate the existence of the world beyond our representations, and second, to demonstrate that that the knowledge we have constitutes precisely the knowledge of the world in which we live and is, in fact, actual knowledge, not chimer. Thus the problem of realism takes on an almost exclusively epistemological meaning. Nevertheless, contemporary realistic positions often confuse ontological and epistemological theses, which leads to internal contradictions. The same is true of the proponents of anti-realist views. The question of the causes of the anti-realistic tendency in the philosophy of science is raised and it is shown that the initial attitude of the modern science was realistic. It was undermined, on the one hand, by anti-realistic interpretations of the cognitive process (starting from Kant), on the other hand, by difficulties of theoretical order arisen in physics, and the main thing was that science began to deal with the unobservable, undermining the cognitive basis of radical empiricism. However, the new cognitive situation does not necessarily lead to anti-realism, another way of development relies on an understanding of the complexity and problematic relationship between theory and experience. A number of reasons in favor of scientific realism are concluded.38 1
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