Rawlsianism and what is urgent
Journal
Tópicos
ISSN
2007-8498
Publisher
Universidad Panamericana
Date Issued
2024-08-15
Author(s)
Camacho-Beltrán, Enrique
Type
journal-article
Abstract
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls asserted that his conception of justice should provide guidance for a non-ideal theory of real-world injustices. Nonetheless, he established at the same time an enigmatic limit to his framing in which neither po-litical philosophy nor justice as fairness should be understood as applied approaches. It is unclear how guidance against real-world injustices is possible, since it would presumably require insights into applied ethics. This paper focuses on drafting a possible alter-native by offering a partially comprehensive reconstruction of the reasonable as a virtue. The hope is to use the virtue of reasonable citizens to transfer Rawlsian ponderations into a special kind of applied ethics controversies concerned with urgent public debates and resistance politics. The idea of this construction is to allow the virtue of the reasonable to establish a standard for citizen conduct
Table of contents
1. Introduction -- 2. The Rawlsian role of the reasonable -- 3. Finding the contours of the problem -- 4. Employing R for problems of applied ethics -- 5. Preserving the Rawlsian pedigree of reasonableness in its application -- 6. Is R already implicit in Rawls’ account?
