Aristotle’s Criticism of the Soul’s Self-Motion in DA I
Journal
Tópicos
ISSN
2007-8498
Publisher
Universidad Panamericana. Facultad de Filosofía
Date Issued
2024
Author(s)
Sánchez Castro, Liliana Carolina
Type
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article
Abstract
In this paper, I examine Aristotle’s position on the theory of the soul as a self-moving entity in the light of a less nega-tive conception of his discussion with his predecessors. For this purpose, I discuss the hypothesis according to which Aristotle is producing the concepts necessary for his own research through a critique of Plato’s claims. I show that, more than a criticism, what we are witnessing is a process of conceptual appropriation where Aristotle filters an opinion to make a better use of it. I sup-port my argument by showing how Aristotle’s exegetical device works and how it could be connected to his own definitional procedures in De Anima’s book II.
License
Acceso Abierto
How to cite
Sánchez Castro, L. C. (2024). La crítica de Aristóteles al automovimiento del alma en DA I. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (69), 11–29. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v690.2624