The Intentional Structure of Image: Attentive Meaning and Image Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology

This article considers Edmund Husserl’s description of image consciousness from the viewpoint of the role played by attentive meaning (meinen) in the intention of the image subject. We argue that the intention of the image subject has to be interpreted in the sense of the attentive meaning as presented in the second partof Husserl’s 1904/5 lecture on Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge. Attentive meaning performs 1) the segregation of a specific appre-hension along with the attentive articulation of experience, and 2), as a formative and preferential function, it introduces a differ-ence in the objective consideration. First, we explain the connec-tion between apprehension, attentive meaning, and object; then, we clarify the relationship between apprehension and attentive meaning in image consciousness in the 1898 manuscripts and the 1904 lecture; finally, we set forth the motivation for the intending of the image subject on the basis of the image apprehension

Introduction -- I. Apprehension, intention, and meaning -- II. Attention in the early notes on image consciousness -- III. Image consciousness from the viewpoint of attentive meaning -- IV. Concluding and critical remarks